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CAN A STATE’S WATER RIGHTS BE 
DAMMED? ENVIRONMENTAL FLOWS AND 
FEDERAL DAMS IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Reed D. Benson* 
ABSTRACT 
 Interstate rivers are subject to the doctrine of equitable apportionment, whereby the 
Supreme Court seeks to ensure that all states that share such rivers get a fair portion of 
their benefits. The Court has rarely issued an equitable apportionment decree, however, 
and there is little law on whether the doctrine protects river flows for environmental 
purposes. The ongoing Florida v. Georgia litigation in the Supreme Court raises this 
issue, as Florida seeks to limit consumptive uses by upstream Georgia to preserve flows in 
the Apalachicola River, which provide both economic and environmental benefits. This 
Article summarizes both the equitable apportionment doctrine and the concept of 
environmental flows and then considers prior Supreme Court cases dealing with 
environmental issues on interstate rivers. It then examines Florida v. Georgia, including 
the Court’s 2018 decision where it narrowly allowed the litigation to continue. A key issue 
in that decision was the role of the Army Corps of Engineers, which operates several 
federal dams in the river basin at issue in the case. This Article examines the views of the 
Court on the role of the Corps and its dam operations and contends that the Court focused 
too narrowly on the agency’s existing plan while overlooking the broader legal and policy 
context. It concludes with some brief thoughts on the future of the Florida v. Georgia 
litigation and environmental flows. 
 * Dickason Chair and Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law. The author thanks 
James Grieco, UNM Law Class of 2019, for his excellent research assistance. He also thanks the Dicka-
son endowment and the UNM School of Law for their financial support of the work that went into this 
Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure.”1 Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes wrote those words almost 90 years ago in a Supreme Court decision in-
volving an interstate water dispute over the Delaware River.2 That simple but elo-
quent statement suggests that the Court recognized the river for its natural values, 
as well as a source of water for economic activities.3 
In the Delaware River case, the Court applied the doctrine of equitable appor-
tionment to protect New Jersey’s interest in the river’s fisheries, water quality, and 
recreational uses, while giving New York a limited right to use it for municipal wa-
ter supply.4 In subsequent cases involving other rivers, the Court has allowed 
states to assert an interest in water for environmental and recreational uses but has 
not clearly established that the equitable apportionment doctrine protects envi-
ronmental flows. 
Today, Florida is attempting to use the equitable apportionment doctrine to 
ensure adequate flows on the Apalachicola River in order to protect both the eco-
system that relies on the river and the oyster fishery in the river’s estuary. While 
that fishery has commercial value, Florida is clearly seeking to defend environmen-
tal as well as economic interests in its Supreme Court litigation against Georgia, 
which is upstream. Having narrowly survived dismissal in a 5-4 decision at the end 
of the 2018 term,5 Florida’s lawsuit lives on, giving the Court an opportunity to 
clarify how equitable apportionment applies to environmental flows in the modern 
era. 
The key issue in the Court’s recent decision was the role of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (the Corps), which operates several dams in the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) Basin. The dams form a system of federal water pro-
jects that the Corps operates to serve certain purposes – including hydropower, 
water supply, and recreation – as authorized by Congress. These dams play an im-
portant role in determining flow patterns in the Apalachicola, but because the fed-
eral government is not a party to the litigation, the Court has no power to order 
any change in the Corps’ operations. A divided Court decided that the absence of 
the Corps did not necessarily preclude an effective judicial remedy for Florida. 
 1. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931). 
 2. Id. at 341. 
 3. A mere five years later, however, the Court quoted the “treasure” line to emphasize the need 
to make maximum beneficial use of water in the arid West. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 527 
(1936). That case focused entirely on the use of the interstate Walla Walla River for irrigation and es-
sentially allowed Oregon to continue drying up the river during the irrigation season. Id. at 522-24. In 
that case, at least, the Court viewed the river as a “treasure” only in the economic sense of the word. 
 4. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 345-48. 
 5. Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502 (2018).  
 
BENSON_MEA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/21/2019  2:05 PM 
374 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 8:2 
This Article begins by summarizing three disparate aspects of the ACF water 
dispute. First, this Article will examine the equitable apportionment doctrine as 
created and applied by the Court in interstate litigation. Next, it will describe wa-
ter projects built and operated by the Corps in the ACF Basin. Finally, this Article 
will discuss the concept of environmental flows to support healthy rivers and river-
dependent ecosystems. The following section considers Supreme Court decisions 
in interstate cases to determine whether environmental flows may be a relevant 
consideration under equitable apportionment. The Article then turns to the ongo-
ing Florida v. Georgia case, briefly examining the dispute over water use in the 
ACF Basin, the Court’s recent decision allowing the case to continue, and the 
statements in the opinion bearing on environmental flows. It then specifically ad-
dresses the Corps’ role in the ACF Basin and argues that the Court focused too 
narrowly on the Corps’ current ACF operating plan and overlooked the broader 
legal and policy context. The Article concludes with some brief thoughts on the 
future of the Florida v. Georgia litigation. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
This section addresses three products of the twentieth century. Between 1900 
and 1945, the Supreme Court announced the equitable apportionment doctrine, 
refined it in a series of interstate water cases, and applied it to allocate the water of 
three different river systems among the contending states. Beginning in the 1930s, 
Congress authorized the Corps to build dams for flood control and other purposes, 
and today the Corps operates hundreds of dams across the nation. The concept of 
environmental flows (or instream flows for environmental purposes) developed in 
the latter half of the twentieth century, as state and federal laws began recognizing 
the need for adequate flows to support fish populations and other features of river-
dependent ecosystems. This section considers these developments, beginning with 
the law of equitable apportionment. 
A.  Equitable Apportionment in the Supreme Court 
Lawsuits in which one state sues another are “original jurisdiction” cases that 
go directly to the Supreme Court,6 which appoints a special master to take evi-
dence and prepare a series of reports on the disputed issues. The Court decides the 
matter after considering the reports and the parties’ exceptions to them.7 When the 
first such case – a dispute between Kansas and Colorado over the waters of the Ar-
 6. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 7. See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987). Litigation over the Pecos River in-
volved a series of reports issued by a succession of special masters, with whom the Court sometimes 
disagreed on key points. Although that dispute was governed by the Pecos River Compact rather than 
the equitable apportionment doctrine, it provides a good illustration of the role of special masters in the 
Supreme Court’s interstate water cases.  
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kansas River8 – reached the Court, there was no established law to apply. The 
Court developed and announced the equitable apportionment doctrine in Kansas v. 
Colorado.9 While the Court denied relief to downstream Kansas in that case, it al-
lowed for a future suit if increased uses of the river in Colorado caused substantial 
injury to Kansas “to the extent of destroying the equitable apportionment of bene-
fits between the two States resulting from the flow of the river.”10 
The Court refined and clarified the equitable apportionment doctrine over the 
next few decades in cases involving a variety of interstate waters, both eastern and 
western. The Court first apportioned a river in 1922, effectively protecting estab-
lished irrigation uses of the Laramie River in Wyoming by limiting an upstream 
diversion to a different watershed in Colorado.11 Later cases would apportion the 
waters of the Delaware River, primarily between New York and New Jersey,12 and 
the North Platte, primarily between Wyoming and Nebraska.13 Although there 
would be later cases under the equitable apportionment doctrine,14 the North 
Platte decision of 1945 was the last time the Court issued a decree apportioning the 
waters of an interstate river. 
Nebraska v. Wyoming is best known for its statement of the Court’s approach 
in deciding an interstate water case under equitable apportionment: 
Apportionment calls for the exercise of an informed judgment on a con-
sideration of many factors . . . . [P]hysical and climatic conditions, the 
consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river, the character 
and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of 
storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, 
the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream 
areas if a limitation is imposed on the former—these are all relevant fac-
tors. They are merely an illustrative not an exhaustive catalogue. They 
indicate the nature of the problem of apportionment and the delicate ad-
justment of interests which must be made.15 
 8. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 47-55 (1907). 
 9. Id. at 97-98 (stating that, where the actions of one State “through the agency of natural 
laws” had affected another State, the Court would seek to “recognize the equal rights of both and at the 
same time establish justice between them”). 
 10. Id. at 118. 
 11. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 485-96 (1922). 
 12. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 345-48 (1931). Pennsylvania was also a party to the 
case. 
 13. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 637-54, 667-69 (1945). Colorado was also a party to 
the case. 
 14. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico (Colorado v. New Mexico I), 459 U.S. 176 (1982) and Col-
orado v. New Mexico (Colorado v. New Mexico II), 467 U.S. 310 (1984). 
 15. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 618. Because that case involved two states that allocate 
and manage water under the prior appropriation doctrine, whereby the longest-established uses get pri- 
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Thus, equitable apportionment can be viewed as a totality-of-the-circumstances 
test, and the Court has emphasized that in these cases it is more concerned with 
fairness than formulas.16 
In deciding what is fair, however, the Court has repeatedly chosen to protect 
established water uses and the local economies that rely on them. This is a recur-
ring theme in cases involving western rivers where the contending states employ 
the prior appropriation doctrine, under which the longest-established uses take pri-
ority over later ones during times of water shortage.17 But where state laws may 
give absolute priority to the earliest uses, the Court has said only that “priority of 
appropriation is the guiding principle,”18 which may prove less important than pro-
tecting established but junior users. “So far as possible those established uses 
should be protected though strict application of the priority rule might jeopardize 
them.”19 
From its early interstate water cases to the present, the Court has stressed a 
related point: a state seeking relief under equitable apportionment carries a heavy 
burden of showing that the actions of another state are causing or will cause sub-
stantial harm to the plaintiff state’s interests. Kansas v. Colorado established both 
the principle of equitable apportionment and the precedent that the Court may 
deny relief despite a showing of harm.20 The Court has repeatedly stated that be-
fore it will order a remedy in these interstate cases, “the threatened invasion of 
rights must be of serious magnitude and it must be established by clear and con-
vincing evidence.”21 More than once the Court has denied relief when it certainly 
could have concluded that a state was using more than its fair share of an interstate 
river.22 
In addition to this judicial bar, there is another key reason why the Supreme 
Court has apportioned so few rivers: it has repeatedly urged states to resolve water 
disputes through negotiated compacts rather than litigation. As the Court noted 
ority during times when water supplies are short, the Court also noted that “[p]riority of appropriation 
is the guiding principle.” Id. The Court emphasized, however, that it might favor protecting established 
uses over strictly enforcing temporal priorities. “So far as possible those established uses should be pro-
tected though strict application of the priority rule might jeopardize them.” Id. 
 16. Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2513 (2018) (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 
U.S. at 342-43). 
 17. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 
(1936); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Colorado v. New Mexico II, 467 U.S. 310 (1984). 
 18. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 618. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S 46, 117-18 (1907). 
 21. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. at 522 (quoting New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 
309 (1921)); see also Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. at 2514-15 (citing and quoting various cases regarding 
the nature of the required harm and the standard of proof). 
 22. See, e.g., Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. at 522-23 (Oregon irrigators nearly drying up the 
Walla Walla River at the state line); Colorado v. New Mexico II, 467 U.S. at 323-24 (New Mexico uses a 
majority of the water of the Vermejo River, even though 75% of that water originates in Colorado.).  
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near the outset of its latest equitable apportionment decision,23 despite its authori-
ty to adjudicate interstate water disputes, “we have long noted our ‘preference’ that 
States ‘settle their controversies by ‘mutual accommodation and agreement.’”24 
Thus, compacts – negotiated by the interested states, ratified by those states, and 
approved by Congress – are by far the more common means of dividing the waters 
of interstate rivers, especially in the West.25 Compacts have certainly not kept 
states from litigating their water disputes in the Supreme Court,26 but when they 
do, the rule of decision becomes the terms of the relevant compact rather than the 
doctrine of equitable apportionment.27 
B.  Corps of Engineers Water Projects 
The Corps has been a prolific dam-builder since the Flood Control Act of 
1936 made flood control a federal activity.28 This Act made the Corps responsible 
for “[f]ederal investigations and improvements of rivers and other waterways for 
flood control and allied purposes . . . .”29 Recognizing that flood-control dams 
could serve additional uses, Congress authorized the Corps to build multi-purpose 
projects for “an expanding array of public purposes that included flood control, hy-
dropower, flat water recreation, and even irrigation and municipal water supply.”30 
The Corps today owns and operates over 600 dams that can generate nearly a quar-
ter of the nation’s hydropower and store nearly 330 million acre-feet,31 that helped 
prevent nearly half a trillion dollars in flood damages over the course of a recent 
 23. Florida v. Georgia, No. 142, Orig., (S.Ct. filed June 27, 2018) [hereinafter Florida v. Geor-
gia slip op.]. 
 24. Id., slip op. 3 (quoting Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564 (1963), in turn quoting Col-
orado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943)). 
 25. Whereas only three rivers have been apportioned directly by the Supreme Court, there are 
over two dozen interstate water compacts, mostly apportioning western rivers. See Jerome C. Muys et 
al., Utton Transboundary Resources Center Model Interstate Water Compact, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 17, 21 
(2007). 
 26. See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 556 (1983) (Pecos River Compact); Kansas v. 
Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2001) (Arkansas River Compact). 
 27. See Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2513 (2018) (noting that equitable apportionment 
principles apply in the absence of a compact). 
 28. Flood Control Act of 1936 Pub. L. No.  74-738, § 1, 49 Stat. 1570, 1570 (codified at 33 
U.S.C. § 701a (2018)) (stating “the sense of Congress that flood control on navigable rivers or their 
tributaries is a proper activity of the Federal Government in cooperation with States” and local gov-
ernments). 
 29. Id. § 2 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701b (2018)). Congress provided, however, that the Corps’ 
flood control work “shall not interfere with investigations and river improvements incident to reclama-
tion projects” undertaken by the Bureau. Id. 
 30. Robert Haskell Abrams, Water Federalism and the Army Corps of Engineers’ Role in Eastern 
States Water Allocation, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 395, 396 (2009). 
 31. Mission Overview, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, http://www.usace.army.mil/
Missions.aspx (last visited June 10, 2015).  
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decade,32 and that host 370 million recreational visitor days per year.33 While most 
Corps reservoirs are not involved with water supply, more than 100 of them make 
water available for municipal and industrial uses.34 
The authorizing statute(s) for a project specify the purpose(s) for which that 
project was designed and constructed.35 Congress may authorize a project for mul-
tiple purposes, such as flood control, hydropower, and recreation, but give one 
purpose a higher or lower priority than others.36 These project purposes remain 
important today because the purposes generally dictate the operating priorities of a 
project. A statute authorizing a project for flood control and hydropower effective-
ly requires the Corps to operate the dam to serve those purposes, while leaving the 
agency discretion to decide the specific operating practices – that is, the exact tim-
ing and quantity of reservoir storage and releases.37 
The Corps’ choices about reservoir operations make a difference, because op-
erating a reservoir inevitably involves trade-offs between competing values.38 For 
example, reducing dam releases in a time of low river flows will raise reservoir lev-
els and help protect against extended drought, but will stress downstream ecosys-
tems during the time that releases are curtailed. Boosting hydropower production 
during times of peak demand will raise revenue because the price of electricity is 
higher in those times, but dramatic fluctuations in river levels cause problems for 
downstream ecosystems and recreation. In determining its operating practices for a 
project, the Corps must serve authorized purposes while considering the other val-
ues affected. 
 32. “USACE dams contributed to $485 billion in damages prevented from 2004 to 2013, with 
$13.4 billion in damages prevented in 2013. USACE flood damage reduction projects avoid $8.00 in 
damages for every $1.00 invested.” Dam Safety Facts and Figures, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, 
http://www.usace.army.mil/Media/FactSheets/FactSheetArticleView/tabid/219/Article/590578/dam-
safety-facts-and-figures.aspx (last visited June 10, 2015). 
 33. News Release, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to Conduct Visi-
tor Surveys at Recreation Areas Beginning this Spring (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.usace.army.mil/
Media/News-Release-Article-View/Article/475446/us-army-corps-of-engineers-to-conduct-visitor-
surveys-at-recreation-areas-begin/. 
 34. A Congressional Research Service report states that “133 Corps multi-purpose reservoirs in 
26 states have 11.1 million acre-feet of storage space” for municipal and industrial water supply. 
CYNTHIA BROUGHER & NICOLE T. CARTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42805, REALLOCATION OF 
WATER STORAGE AT FEDERAL WATER PROJECTS FOR MUNICIPAL AND INDUSTRIAL WATER 
SUPPLY 3 (2012). 
 35. Reed D. Benson, Reviewing Reservoir Operations: Can Federal Water Projects Adapt to Change?, 
42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 353, 368 (2017). 
 36. Id. at 368-70. 
 37. See id. at 369. 
 38. Id. at 364-67 (discussing examples of such trade-offs, drawn from litigation over Corps and 
Bureau of Reclamation project operations).  
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The Corps’ operating regime for a project is detailed in a “water control plan” 
that is geared to the project’s authorizing legislation and other relevant law.39 Wa-
ter control plans must “include coordinated regulation schedules” for operating a 
project or set or projects, and provide for detailed operating instructions to ensure 
that the project meets its authorized purposes.40 The Corps incorporates the plan 
for a project into a water control manual for that project.41 In a river basin with 
multiple projects that have related purposes, the Corps will produce a “master 
manual” for coordinated operation of the system.42 A water control manual may 
bind the Corps to operate its project(s) in accordance with the terms of the manu-
al, subject to judicial review.43 
The Corps must comply with key environmental laws in developing or revis-
ing its water control manuals. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)44 
requires a federal agency to assess potential environmental impacts and to consider 
alternatives before taking any action that could significantly affect the quality of 
the human environment.45 Thus, the Corps produces an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) in the process of updating a project manual.46 While NEPA im-
poses only procedural duties, the Endangered Species Act (ESA)47 imposes key 
substantive obligations on the Corps. Most significantly, ESA Section 7 commands 
that every federal agency “shall . . . insure that any action authorized, funded, or 
carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence” 
 39. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, NO. 1110-2-240, ENGINEERING AND 
DESIGN – WATER CONTROL MANAGEMENT, ENGINEER REGULATION (2016) [hereinafter Water 
Control Management Rule]. The 2016 rule superseded an earlier rule of the same number, adopted in 
1982. Id., para. 1-1(b). 
 40. Id., para. 3-2(b). 
 41. Id., para. 3-1(f) (A manual must contain additional elements beyond the water control plan, 
including special operating or management rules for “emergency situations, including droughts. . . .”). 
 42. Id., para. 3-1(a). 
 43. See South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2003). The requirement for water 
control plans stems from Section 7 of the Flood Control Act of 1944, directing the Corps “to prescribe 
regulations for the use of storage allocated for flood control or navigation at all reservoirs constructed 
wholly or in part with Federal funds provided on the basis of such purposes, and the operation of any 
such project shall be in accordance with such purposes.” Flood Control Act of 1944, 33 U.S.C. § 709 
(2012). 
 44. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2017). 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). NEPA § 102(2) applies to all agencies of the federal gov-
ernment and states several requirements in addition to the “detailed statement” mandate of subsection 
(C), one of which is to “study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses 
of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available 
resources.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (2012). 
 46. See In re Operation of Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618, 627 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that 
the Corps produced an Environmental Impact Statement in the process of updating its “master manual” 
for operating its projects in the Missouri River System). 
 47. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012).  
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of any threatened species, or adversely modify its designated critical habitat.48 
More than any other environmental law, the ESA has forced the Corps and other 
water managers to evaluate and mitigate the environmental impacts of their opera-
tions, such as by adjusting reservoir releases to benefit downstream ecosystems.49 
C.  Environmental Flows and the Law 
The concept of environmental flows is simple: a river must have enough flow-
ing water to sustain its natural functions and the living things that depend on it. 
Environmental protection, especially protection of important fish populations, is a 
major reason why specific flow levels have been required or recommended on 
many rivers.50 Such prescribed flow levels are often referred to as “instream flows” 
to distinguish them from consumptive uses such as irrigation or municipal water 
supply, which require that water be withdrawn from the river and conveyed to an 
off-stream location.51 
In practice, however, protection of environmental flows is typically not simple 
at all. The primary reason for this is that water suppliers, users, and decision-
makers are often wary of environmental flow requirements, believing they may 
limit access to water for other uses.52 In many places (especially in the West) the 
conflict between consumptive uses and environmental flows is very real53 as many 
rivers have been depleted by water withdrawals to irrigate crops, operate power 
plants, and supply municipal and industrial users.54 Thus, existing water uses 
commonly remove enough water from a river system to leave remaining flows in-
adequate for environmental needs.55 
 48. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). 
 49. Benson, supra note 35, at 378-83 (noting effects of the ESA on project operations and gen-
eral ineffectiveness of other environmental laws in this context). 
 50. See Cynthia F. Covell et al., Update to a Survey of State Instream Flow Programs in the Western 
United States, 20 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 355, 368 (2017) (noting that “instream flow water rights to 
protect fisheries, aquatic habitat, and similar environmental values have become accepted as beneficial 
uses of water in most western states,” and likewise instream flow rights for recreation, water quality, 
and other purposes are recognized “in some states”). 
 51. See DAVID M. GILLILAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION 1-4 
(1997). 
 52. See id. at 133-35. 
 53. See id. at 39-40 (naming several major western rivers as “dry or virtually dry during substan-
tial portions of the year”). 
 54. This phenomenon is not limited to the West, as irrigation and power plant withdrawals, 
especially, have approached or exceeded the available water supplies in certain watersheds throughout 
the nation. See Kristen Averyt et al., Sectoral Contributions to Surface Water Stress in the Coterminous Unit-
ed States, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, July-Sept. 2013, at 3-4. 
 55. THOMAS C. ANNEAR ET AL., INSTREAM FLOW COUNCIL, INSTREAM FLOWS FOR 
RIVERINE RESOURCE STEWARDSHIP 2-3 (2002).  
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The operation of dams and reservoirs can also alter river flows to the detri-
ment of the downstream environment. The United States has over 75,000 dams,56 
which store and release water to serve a variety of purposes such as hydropower 
generation, water supply, flood control, and reservoir recreation. Along with these 
important benefits, however, dams have adversely affected downstream ecosystems 
by altering natural flow patterns and trapping sediment, among other things.57 In 
the words of a leading researcher on dams where river systems have been most in-
tensively impounded, “environmental costs of dams in the form of disrupted 
downstream hydrologic and biotic systems are likely to be greater in those regions 
than elsewhere.”58 
In addition to the challenges posed by dams and consumptive uses, establish-
ing and protecting environmental flows can be complicated for at least two further 
reasons. First, there may be multiple environmental resources or values that de-
pend on flow levels. These resources or values may include fish of various species, 
other wildlife (from birds to aquatic invertebrates), riparian trees or other vegeta-
tion, and water quality to name just a few.59 To the extent that their flow require-
ments differ in quantity or timing, these resources may pose trade-offs in  
determining and managing environmental flows.60 Second, even for a single envi-
ronmental factor – such as an endangered fish species – there may be considerable 
uncertainty and disagreement regarding its specific flow requirements. Thus, there 
may be no clear answer regarding acceptable environmental flows for that species 
in terms of how much water it needs (or how little it can tolerate).61 
 56. William L. Graf, Dam Nation: A Geographic Census of American Dams and Their Large-Scale 
Hydrologic Impacts, 35 WATER RESOURCES RES. 1305, 1305 (1999) (describing Corps of Engineers and 
Federal Emergency Management Agency census of U.S. dams exceeding 6 feet tall with 50 acre-feet of 
storage capacity, or 25 feet tall with 15 acre-feet of storage capacity). 
 57. Id. at 1305, 1308. 
 58. Id. at 1308 (noting that the heavily dammed northern Great Plains, Rocky Mountains, and 
Southwest regions “export water or water-related services [to other regions] while retaining the envi-
ronmental costs”). 
 59. ANNEAR ET AL., supra note 55, at 21-49 (analyzing various factors to be considered in devel-
oping flow protection regimes). 
 60. For example, in updating its long-term operating regime for Glen Canyon Dam on the Col-
orado River, the Interior Department had to balance the needs of a popular trout fishery just below the 
dam; the endangered humpback chub further downstream; and the broader Grand Canyon ecosystem, 
including the riverside beaches relied upon by rafters. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD 
OF DECISION FOR THE GLEN CANYON DAM LONG-TERM EXPERIMENTAL AND MANAGEMENT 
PLAN FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT at 3-5 (2016). 
 61. Such disagreements have been the crux of much litigation over the impact of federal water 
project operations on endangered species. See, e.g., Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Bureau of 
Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082, 1087-95 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting federal agency conclusion that salmon 
in the Klamath River would not be jeopardized by eight years of flow levels lower than recommended 
by scientific studies).  
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Despite these and other challenges, environmental flows have gained increas-
ing acceptance and recognition under state laws. This is true even in the West,62 
where existing consumptive water demands often exceed the naturally available 
supplies,63 and where environmental flow protections potentially could restrict de-
velopment of new water supplies for growing populations.64 Most of the eastern 
states have also established some legal mechanism for protecting environmental 
flows, primarily for fisheries and water quality purposes.65 While state laws differ 
widely in several respects,66 there are a few general approaches by which these laws 
protect flows from impairment. These include setting aside a certain quantity of 
water that will not be available for new uses, restricting approval of new uses on a 
case-by-case basis, and establishing new water rights for to preserve a certain level 
of environmental flow.67 
Federal law, by contrast, has no general framework for establishing and pro-
tecting environmental flows. Environmental flows may be protected under the re-
served rights (or Winters) doctrine,68 where the federal government designated 
lands for an environmental purpose, and water is needed to fulfill that purpose.69 
The Court denied environmental flow claims on national forest land, however, es-
sentially stating that such federal claims should be construed narrowly.70 Another 
relevant law is the Federal Power Act, which requires licensing of non-federal hy-
 62. As stated in a recent article surveying relevant developments in the West since 1998: 
In the past twenty years, states have gained more experience with instream flows. Some 
programs have matured considerably as instream water rights have taken their place in 
states’ priority systems . . . . Instream flow rights for a variety of uses are now an accepted 
type of water right in most western states . . . . 
Covell et al., supra note 50, at 356. 
 63. Averyt et al., supra note 54, at 3-5. 
 64. Covell et al., supra note 50, at 355. 
 65. ALLAN LOCKE ET AL., INTEGRATED APPROACHES TO RIVERINE RESOURCE 
STEWARDSHIP 299 (2008) (identifying 24 states east of (or bordering) the Mississippi River as having 
some type of instream flow law; “[m]ost protect only minimum flows to provide for delineated purpos-
es, typically fisheries and water quality”). 
 66. Id. at 287-302 (describing key elements of instream flow laws in various states, primarily in 
the western U.S.). 
 67. GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 51, at 137-45 (discussing use of such approaches in the 
western U.S. states). 
 68. The doctrine originated with Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), in which the Su-
preme Court held that an Indian reservation has a right under federal law to enough water to fulfill the 
reservation’s purposes. 
 69. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 140 (1976) (recognizing reserved water right 
for Devil’s Hole National Monument, established to protect an underground pool in Nevada and the 
fish species endemic to that pool). 
 70. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702-03 (1978) (reserved water rights should be 
recognized only for “primary purposes” for which lands were designated, and only for the amount min-
imally needed for such purposes).  
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dropower projects by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).71 Up-
on expiration of a license, “FERC relicensing” can require re-operation of the pro-
ject to improve environmental flows, to the point of making the project uneconom-
ical to operate.72 Ironically, while the Federal Power Act requires periodic review 
of operating conditions for non-federal hydropower projects, there is no similar 
requirement for federal dams and reservoirs operated by the Corps of Engineers or 
Bureau of Reclamation.73 The most effective environmental law in this context has 
been the ESA,74 especially as more fish and other aquatic species have been listed 
as threatened or endangered.75 
Even though many states now provide for protection of environmental flows 
within their own borders, environmental flow requirements are generally absent 
from interstate water allocation compacts, at least in the West. In other words, 
these compacts – negotiated by the affected states and approved by Congress – es-
sentially ignore environmental concerns in favor of allocating water for consump-
tive uses.76 Interstate river basins without a compact, however, are governed by the 
equitable apportionment doctrine,77 and the next section examines whether the ex-
isting doctrine recognizes environmental flows. 
II.  DOES THE EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT DOCTRINE PROTECT 
ENVIRONMENTAL FLOWS? 
The Supreme Court has applied the equitable apportionment doctrine to in-
terstate disputes involving several different river systems, both East and West. 
Although there is no clear precedent for a right to environmental flows on inter-
state rivers, the Court’s equitable apportionment jurisprudence strongly suggests 
that the doctrine may be used to mitigate environmental harm caused by water de-
velopment and use. 
 71. 16 U.S.C. § 817(l) (2012). 
 72. City of Tacoma v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 460 F.3d 53, 71-75 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(upholding increased flows to be supplied by relicensed project, based on statutory requirements to bal-
ance hydropower and environmental interests). 
 73. Benson, supra note 35, at 408-11. 
 74. See In re Operation of Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618, 625-27 (8th Cir. 2005); supra 
notes 47-48. 
 75. Benson, supra note 35, at 378. 
 76. See Reed D. Benson, Environmental Issues in the Allocation and Management of Western Inter-
state Rivers, 24 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 183, 191-95 (2014) (addressing the absence of environmen-
tal provisions in western interstate water compacts). Even in basins governed by such compacts, howev-
er, the ESA has prompted efforts to improve environmental flows for the benefit of listed species. Id. at 
195-202. 
 77. See Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2513 (2018).  
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A.  The Delaware River Case: Water Quality, Fish, and Recreation 
One of the earliest equitable apportionment cases involved a dispute between 
three eastern states over the waters of the Delaware River system. New Jersey sued 
upstream New York in the Supreme Court, seeking to block a proposed diversion 
from tributaries of the Delaware to the Hudson River basin to supply municipal 
water to New York City.78 New York sought to divert 600 million gallons per day 
(mgd) for this purpose, but Pennsylvania – which had its own designs on using the 
river to supply water to greater Philadelphia – intervened and argued that New 
York’s diversion should be limited to 440 mgd.79 New Jersey took the position that 
New York had adequate supplies within the Hudson watershed and should be pro-
hibited from diverting any water out of the Delaware River basin.80 
New Jersey contended that depleted flows caused by New York’s diversion 
would harm New Jersey in various ways, some of which were purely economic: im-
pairment of navigation, reduction in water power for riparian lands, and degrada-
tion of water quality to the detriment of industrial users.81 Crucially, however, 
New Jersey argued further that the diversion would do substantial harm to the 
Delaware’s “use and value for recreation; to the oyster industry; to fish; to agricul-
ture; and from the standpoint of sanitation and water supply.”82 These alleged in-
juries certainly raised economic concerns, but also affected environmental, recrea-
tional, and public health interests. 
The special master’s report83 essentially found that New Jersey failed to prove 
that the proposed diversion would cause the alleged economic injuries. It specifi-
cally found no harm to navigability,84 and no likely impairment to potential hy-
dropower generation.85 The Court also summarized the report as finding that the 
proposed 600 mgd diversion would not “materially affect the River or its sanitary 
condition, or as a source of municipal water supply, or for industrial uses, or for 
agriculture, or for the fisheries for shad.”86 Thus, the master’s report said that even 
 78. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 341-42 (1931). 
 79. Id. at 345 (referring to a “Pennsylvania plan” that included a 440 mgd limit on New York’s 
proposed diversion). 
 80. This argument relied on the common law of riparian rights, which New Jersey argued 
should apply to this dispute between three states that recognize riparian rights. Id. at 338-39. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 339. This quote comes from the statement of New Jersey’s position, which precedes 
Justice Holmes’ opinion. The opinion itself restates New Jersey’s list of alleged harms, clarifying that 
the oyster industry may be harmed by increasing salinity in the lower river and the Delaware Bay estu-
ary; that the key fish species of concern was shad; and that agriculture may be harmed by lower river 
levels that “injure the cultivation of adjoining lands.” Id. at 343-44. 
 83. The court praised the master’s report as “most competent and excellent . . . .” Id. at 343. 
 84. The testimony of a high-level Corps of Engineers general was apparently influential on this 
point. Id. at 344. 
 85. Id. at 345. 
 86. Id.  
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at the maximum proposed level, New York’s diversion would cause none of the 
kinds of injuries that would seem to carry the greatest economic weight. 
But all was not lost for New Jersey, as the report also found that at the pro-
posed level of 600 mgd, “the effect upon the use for recreation and upon its reputa-
tion in that regard will be somewhat more serious, as will be the effect of increased 
salinity of the river on the oyster fisheries. The total is found to be greater than 
New Jersey ought to bear . . . . ”87 The Court did not discuss the potential eco-
nomic significance of either recreational use of the Delaware or the river-
dependent oyster fisheries, but harm to those two interests prompted the special 
master’s report to recommend – and the Court to adopt – three important condi-
tions on New York’s proposed diversion for municipal water supply. 
The Court found that New Jersey’s harm could be “removed” by, first, limit-
ing New York’s diversion to 440 mgd – a reduction of over 25% from the proposed 
level.88 Second, the Court ordered New York to build and operate a wastewater 
treatment plant at Port Jervis to keep that town’s sewage and industrial waste from 
polluting the Delaware.89 The Court imposed specific performance requirements 
on this plant90 without explaining why water quality improvement was necessary 
to reduce harm to oyster fisheries or recreational uses. Third, the Court required 
that water be released from one of New York City’s reservoirs as needed to main-
tain specified minimum flows in the Delaware at Port Jervis and at Trenton, New 
Jersey.91 Thus, the Court protected flows for oysters and recreation not only by 
limiting diversions, but also by ordering release of stored water to ensure specified 
levels of the Delaware River. 
This result is all the more remarkable because of the outcome of a factually 
similar case that the Court decided about 70 days before New Jersey v. New York. In 
that earlier case, Connecticut sued upstream Massachusetts to block a proposed 
diversion of water for Boston’s municipal supply from tributaries of the Connecti-
cut River.92 Connecticut argued that this diversion would harm many of the same 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 345-46. The Court did not explain why it (or the special master) chose this specific 
level of diversion. 
 89. Id. at 346. 
 90. The Court directed that the Port Jervis plant must treat the town’s sewage and industrial 
wastewater to the degree that “organic impurities” would be reduced by 85 percent; “that the B. coli 
originally present in the sewage” be reduced by 90%; and that the resulting effluent be “practically free 
from suspended matter and non-putrescent.” The decree ordered that the plant be maintained so long 
as New York diverted water from the Delaware River system. Id. at 346. 
 91. The Court stated these minimum flows as being 1,535 cubic feet per second (cfs) at Port 
Jervis, and 3,400 cfs at Trenton. The Court generally required reservoir releases as needed to maintain 
these minimum levels but allowed for lower releases under specified circumstances. Id. at 346-47. The 
Court did not explain the source of these minimum levels. 
 92. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 662 (1931). The Court decided this case on 
Feb. 24, and New Jersey v. New York on May 4, 1931.  
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interests that New Jersey invoked in the Delaware River case, including naviga-
tion, hydropower, agriculture, a shad fishery, and sanitation.93 Accepting the spe-
cial master’s report, the Court denied the requested injunction declaring that 
“[d]rinking and other domestic purposes are the highest uses of water.”94 Essential-
ly, Massachusetts convinced the special master that its proposed diversion was the 
best option for meeting Boston’s real need for additional water,95 while Connecti-
cut failed to show serious injury from the proposed diversion.96 Importantly, how-
ever, Massachusetts was already required to ensure minimum flows in the Con-
necticut River under a decision of the War Department to ensure adequate levels 
for navigation.97 The Court denied relief not because water quality and fisheries 
concerns were unimportant in an equitable apportionment case but because Con-
necticut could not show significant harm to those interests.98 
B.  The Columbia Case: Interstate Fish Runs 
Nearly half a century after deciding those eastern cases, the Court took up 
Idaho’s lawsuit against Oregon and Washington over the Columbia-Snake River 
system.99 This was a different kind of equitable apportionment proceeding, howev-
er, because upstream Idaho sought to protect its interests not in water, but in salm-
on runs.100 
 93. Id. at 664. Missing from this list, however, are the two harms – oyster fishing and recreation 
– that the Court found in the Delaware River case. 
 94. Id. at 673. The Court cited no authority for this statement. 
 95. The special master’s report found that greater Boston was “faced with a serious water short-
age in the near future” that would require “a large quantity of additional water,” and that there was “no 
serious dispute” about Boston’s need for more water. Id. at 664-65. Connecticut argued that Boston 
could get the water from two other sources within Massachusetts, but the special master found that 
those sources were inferior, largely because the available water was polluted by upstream cities and in-
dustries. Id. at 667-69. 
 96. Id. at 672 (finding nothing in the master’s report “to justify an inference that any real or 
substantial injury or damage will presently result to Connecticut from the diversions of Massachu-
setts . . . .”) 
 97. Similar to the Supreme Court decision on the Delaware, the War Department approval for 
Boston’s diversion required releases from storage in order to ensure specified minimum flows in the 
Connecticut. Id. at 665. Massachusetts told the Court that it would comply with these conditions. Id. at 
666. 
 98. When the Court stated flatly, “No discussion is required as to the effect of the proposed 
diversion upon the navigability of the river, agriculture, fish life or pollution in Connecticut,” id. at 672, 
it was because the special master’s report had found no harm to those interests. Id. at 665-67. Harm to 
Connecticut’s interest in hydropower development was a closer call on the facts, id. at 673, but nothing 
in the opinion suggests that fish and water quality are lesser interests than navigation, agriculture, or 
hydropower for purposes of equitable apportionment. 
 99. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 429 U.S. 163 (1976) (granting Idaho leave to file complaint); 
Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon 431 U.S. 952 (1977) (referring the matter to a special master). 
 100. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon (Idaho I), 444 U.S. 380, 385 (1980).  
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As explained by the Court in its final opinion in this litigation (Idaho II),101 
these salmon runs are “one of the valuable natural resources of the Columbia-
Snake River system in the Pacific Northwest.”102 Juvenile salmon hatch from eggs 
in the freshwater rivers of Idaho, Oregon, and Washington. As juvenile “smolts” 
they migrate downriver to the ocean where they spend most of their lives. As 
adults they return to their home rivers to spawn, and the fish of a given species 
that return in a particular season are referred to as a “run.”103 Idaho’s lawsuit in-
volved two runs of chinook salmon and one of steelhead trout,104 and as the Court 
noted, “runs of all the relevant species since 1973 have been significantly lower.”105 
On the key threshold issue, the Court ruled in Idaho I that the equitable ap-
portionment doctrine applied to fish and gave Idaho a right to its fair share of the 
interstate runs. The Court noted that the doctrine originated in water rights litiga-
tion but saw interstate fish runs as an analogous resource that could be allocated 
under the same principles. “A dispute over the water flowing through the Colum-
bia-Snake River system would be resolved by the equitable apportionment doc-
trine; we see no reason to accord different treatment to a controversy over a similar 
resource of that system.”106 The Court concluded that, although Idaho could not 
claim ownership of the fish themselves, it did have an equitable right to its fair 
share of the runs.107 
Idaho argued that it was not receiving its fair share because Oregon and 
Washington were allowing too much commercial and sport fishing of the runs, de-
pleting the populations and preventing enough adults from reaching Idaho wa-
ters.108 A complex set of legal arrangements governed the allowable “harvest” of 
these runs and the allocation of that harvest between Oregon and Washington and 
also between Indian and non-Indian fishers.109 With the tribal share of the harvest 
protected by treaties and judicial decisions,110 Idaho sought only to establish a right 
 101. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon (Idaho II), 462 U.S. 1017, 1029 (1983). 
 102. Id. at 1018-19. 
 103. Id. at 1019-20. 
 104. Id. at 1020. 
 105. Id. at 1023 (noting that the parties dispute the reasons for the declining runs of these spe-
cies). 
 106. Id. at 1024. The Court also observed, “Much as in a water dispute, a State that overfishes a 
run downstream deprives an upstream State of the fish it would otherwise receive.” Id. 
 107. Id. at 1025. 
 108. Id. at 1028 n.12 (addressing Idaho’s allegations of overfishing and mismanagement by the 
downstream states). 
 109. The Court discussed these arrangements in some detail in its opinion dealing with whether 
the case must be dismissed for failure to join the United States. Idaho I, 444 U.S. 380, 383-85 (1980). 
 110. The Court summarized years of litigation between tribes and the States of Oregon and 
Washington, ultimately resulting in a decision awarding the tribes a treaty-based right to half of the 
Columbia River salmon harvest. Id. at 384 (citing Sohappy v. Smith, 529 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1976)).  
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to a portion of the non-Indian harvest of the Columbia-Snake runs.111 Unlike the 
downstream states, which had both commercial and recreational fishing, Idaho’s 
fishery was entirely recreational.112 
While Idaho alleged overfishing,113 the Court noted another reason for the de-
clining fish runs: a string of federal dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers, each 
of which took a toll on populations of juvenile and adult salmon attempting to mi-
grate past them.114 The federal dams had such an impact that they were a major 
reason the special master recommended dismissal of Idaho’s lawsuit for failure to 
join the United States.115 The Court did not see the special master’s argument as a 
compelling reason to dismiss the case because even though the dams had major im-
pacts on the salmon runs,116 Idaho was not seeking any changes in dam opera-
tions.117 Without the United States in the case, the parties had to accept federal 
dam operations as a given.118 Beginning in the 1990s, those operations would be the 
focus of a series of cases involving the government’s compliance with the Endan-
gered Species Act.119 
In the end, Idaho failed to show that the actions of the downstream states had 
prevented the state from getting its fair share of the salmon. The special master 
and the Court in Idaho II reached this result largely by focusing narrowly on the 
period from 1975 through 1980, during which Idaho took more than half of the 
available harvest of these runs.120 Thus, the Court denied relief despite acknowl-
edging that “Oregon and Washington may have harvested a disproportionate share 
of the [runs] over the long run,”121 and may have allowed some overfishing of runs 
 111. Id. at 385. 
 112. Id. at 385 n.4. 
 113. Id. at 385. 
 114. Id. at 382-84; Idaho II, 462 U.S. 1017, 1020-21 (1983). 
 115. The other reasons were the federal government’s control over salmon fishing in the Pacific 
Ocean, and the role of the United States as trustee for the tribes with treaty-based fishing rights. Idaho 
I, 444 U.S. at 387. 
 116. Id. at 388: 
We do not find this consideration a persuasive reason for dismissing Idaho’s suit. We can 
assume, as suggested by defendants, that the eight dams along the Columbia and Snake Riv-
ers are the primary reason why more fish do not successfully migrate back to Idaho. Never-
theless, Idaho stresses that it has no quarrel with the operation of the various dams. 
 117. Id. 
 118. In its later decision on the merits, the Court observed that “Idaho accepts, as it must, the 
continued operation of the dams and their adverse impact on the runs.” Idaho II, 462 U.S. at 1027 n.11. 
 119. See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Role of the Judge in ESA Implementation: Dis-
trict Judge James Redden and the Columbia Basin Salmon Saga, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 87, 110-142 (2013) 
(describing about 20 years of litigation over federal dam operations on the Columbia). 
 120. Idaho II, 462 U.S. at 1027-28. 
 121. Id. As the Court noted in a footnote, Idaho claimed that for the period 1962-1980, the 
downstream states had harvested the great majority of all the Idaho-origin fish from all three runs: 83% 
of spring chinook, 75% of summer chinook, and 58% of steelhead originating in Idaho. Id. at 1028 n.12.  
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as recently as 1974.122 Here, the Court split with three justices arguing in dissent 
that the special master and the Court had focused too narrowly on whether Idaho’s 
share of the harvest had been fair from 1975 through 1980.123 Yet, all nine justices 
agreed that Idaho had a right to a fair share of the fish runs.124 
C.  The Second North Platte Case: Endangered Species Habitat 
Resolving a three-state dispute over irrigation water supplies, the Court in 
1945 divided the waters of the North Platte River primarily between Wyoming 
and Nebraska.125 The Court began its opinion by stating, “The controversy per-
tains to the use for irrigation purposes of the water of the North Platte River,”126 
and devoted 40 pages of factual, legal and equitable analysis to irrigation exclusive-
ly.127 The key outcome involved the “pivotal reach” of 41 river miles ending just 
below the Wyoming-Nebraska border, with the Court allocating 75 percent of irri-
gation season flows to Nebraska and 25 percent to Wyoming.128 
Forty years later, Nebraska again sued Wyoming and Colorado over the wa-
ters of the North Platte. By the 1980s, the need for environmental flows to provide 
habitat for endangered birds along the Central Platte River in Nebraska had be-
come a major concern for water users throughout the basin.129 In returning to the 
 122. Id. at 1028-29. 
 123. Joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, Justice O’Connor argued that the Court should 
have taken a longer view of the issue, and considered a broader range of factors in deciding whether 
Idaho was receiving her equitable share of the runs: 
The Master should not have concluded that, simply because Idaho shared equally in the 
failure of the harvest in 1975-80, it had no further interest in promoting the conservation of 
the species and the eventual restoration of the runs, neither of which could occur without 
proper management practices on the part of the defendants. 
Id. at 1034 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 124. The two opinions saw this issue quite similarly for the most part. See id. at 1024-25; id. 
1030-31 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent declared, “Idaho has a right to seek to maintain and 
eventually increase the runs by requiring the defendants to refrain from practices that prevent fish from 
returning to their spawning grounds in numbers sufficient to perpetuate the species in this river sys-
tem.” Id. at 1033 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 125. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 637-54, 667-69 (1945) (Colorado, source of the North 
Platte headwaters, was also a party.). 
 126. Id. at 591. 
 127. See id. at 616-55. A single paragraph at the end of the opinion mentioned other uses, noting 
that the parties had agreed that the decree should not limit the use of water for “ordinary and usual do-
mestic and municipal purposes.” The Court agreed and added livestock watering to the list at Wyo-
ming’s suggestion. Id. at 656. 
 128. See id. at 637-54, 667-69. 
 129. See John Echeverria, No Success Like Failure: The Platte River Collaborative Watershed Planning 
Process, 25 WM. & MARY ENVT’L L & POL’Y REV. 559, 565-70 (2001) (describing history of Platte Riv-
er Basin endangered species controversies in the 1980s through the mid-1990s); see also Riverside Irriga-
tion Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 514 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that Corps of Engineers must con- 
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Supreme Court, Nebraska initially “sought modification of the decree to make 
Wyoming and Colorado share the burden of providing instream flows necessary to 
preserve critical wildlife habitat,”130 but this motion was denied without explana-
tion.131 Thus, the Court rejected Nebraska’s attempt to expand the single-use 1945 
decree into a multi-purpose allocation of the waters of the South Platte. 
Environmental flows remained relevant in the litigation, however, as the 
Court later ruled that it would consider evidence of environmental injury in Ne-
braska in deciding whether to enjoin proposed upstream water projects. Wyoming 
argued that the earlier ruling foreclosed Nebraska from raising environmental is-
sues, but the Court rejected that argument: “[t]o assign an affirmative obligation to 
protect wildlife is one thing; to consider all downstream effects of upstream devel-
opment when assessing threats to equitable apportionment is quite another.”132 
Although the Court emphasized that Nebraska would have to show substantial in-
jury in order to obtain relief, it gave Nebraska the opportunity to show that injury 
was based on harm to wildlife and wildlife habitat.133 
That was the Court’s last word on the subject, as the states eventually reached 
a settlement that modified the 1945 decree and included a set of detailed re-
strictions on water development and use in Wyoming.134 The states of Colorado, 
Nebraska, and Wyoming, as well as the federal government, would also agree on 
measures to improve environmental flows in Nebraska as part of a broader pro-
gram to restore endangered species habitat along the Platte.135 Thus, even though 
the original decree did not provide for environmental flows and the Court refused 
to order them in the second case, the parties eventually came together in an effort 
to help the river and the species that depend on it.136 Meanwhile, the Court made 
it clear that the water needs of wildlife species and their habitat are relevant factors 
in an equitable apportionment proceeding. 
sider impacts on Platte River endangered species habitat before issuing permit for new water project far 
upstream in Colorado). 
 130. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 12 (1995) (describing Nebraska’s motion filed in 1988). 
 131. Id. (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 485 U.S. 931 (1988)). 
 132. Id. 
 133. The Court said that enjoining a proposed upstream project would mean modifying the 1945 
decree. Before granting such relief, the Court would require Nebraska to show substantial injury, a bur-
den it called “far from insignificant.” Id. (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 592 (1993) (de-
scribing standards for enforcing vs. modifying an equitable apportionment decree)). 
 134. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 534 U.S. 40, 41 (2001) (noting final settlement); id. at 42-60 (speci-
fying terms and conditions). 
 135. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION, PLATTE RIVER RECOVERY 
IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM (2006). 
 136. See Reed Benson, Avoiding Jeopardy, Without the Questions: Recovery Implementation Programs 
for Endangered Species in Western River Basins, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 473, 505-19 (2013) 
(summarizing basic features of the Platte River Recovery Implementation Program and other RIPs in 
western river basins).  
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Consequently, in cases through the 20th century, the Court established that it 
will consider harm to water quality and wildlife in deciding whether a state is re-
ceiving its equitable share of benefits from an interstate river. On the Delaware 
River, the Court issued a decree designed to protect water quality, fisheries, and 
recreation from harm caused by the actions of an upstream state. Today, Florida 
seeks a similar decree in its Supreme Court litigation against Georgia. 
III.  FLORIDA V. GEORGIA: ENVIRONMENTAL FLOWS AND  
FEDERAL DAMS IN THE ACF BASIN 
A.  Prior Disputes and Corps Projects 
The ACF Basin covers much of western Georgia, a sliver of southeastern Ala-
bama, and part of the Florida panhandle. The Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers both 
arise in northern Georgia; the longer Chattahoochee flows just west of Atlanta, 
forms the southern portion of the Alabama-Georgia border, and reaches Lake Sem-
inole near the Florida border. At Lake Seminole, the Flint joins the Chattahoochee 
to form the Apalachicola River, which flows over 100 miles through Florida before 
reaching its estuary at Appachicola Bay.137 While the ACF may not be well known 
outside of water law circles, the Apalachicola is one of the major U.S. rivers in the 
Lower 48 states, with an average annual flow exceeding that of the Sacramento or 
the Hudson.138 
The three states of the ACF Basin have been fighting over its water for a long 
time and much has been written about their dispute.139 While Georgia, Alabama, 
and Florida have been involved in litigation for much of the past 30 years,140 they 
also made efforts to reach an agreement over water allocation. There was even a 
temporary Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, which com-
 137. See Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2508-09 (2018) (describing the rivers as forming a 
“Y” with the Chattahoochee being its left arm, the Flint its right arm, and the Apalachicola its stem). A 
map of the basin appears as an appendix to the opinion at 2528. 
 138. LUNA B. LEOPOLD, A VIEW OF THE RIVER 99-101 (1994) (table showing statistics on the 
world’s major river basins, including average annual discharge). Among U.S. river systems in the Lower 
48, only the Mississippi, Columbia, Mobile, and Susquehanna are larger than the ACF by this measure. 
Id. The Apalachicola’s average annual flow is roughly equal to that of the combined Sacramento and 
San Joaquin, though the ACF Basin is only half as large. Id. at 101, 104. 
 139. See, e.g., Carl Erhardt, The Battle Over “The Hooch”: The Federal-Interstate Water Compact and 
the Resolution of Rights in the Chattahoochee River, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 200, 227 (1992); Dustin S. Ste-
phenson, The Tri-State Compact: Falling Waters and Fading Opportunities, 16 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 
83 (2000); Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Allocation of Rivers Before the United States Supreme Court: The 
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River System, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 401 (2004); George William Sherk, 
The Management of Interstate Water Conflicts in the Twenty-First Century: Is It Time to Call Uncle?, 12 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 764, 770-78 (2005). 
 140. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 644 F.3d 1160, 1174-78 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(explaining litigation history).  
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mitted the states “to develop an allocation formula for equitably apportioning the 
surface waters of the ACF Basin among the states while protecting the water quali-
ty, ecology, and biodiversity of the ACF.”141 But this was little more than an 
agreement to agree, and when the states failed to settle on an allocation formula, 
the Compact lapsed in 2003.142 
Much of the ACF water litigation has centered on the Corps’ practices in op-
erating a string of dams in the basin, primarily along the Chattahoochee. The low-
est dam in the system, Jim Woodruff, creates Lake Seminole at the confluence that 
forms the Apalachicola. Congress authorized these dams for a variety of purposes 
including navigation, hydropower, and recreation. The Corps operates these dams 
as a system to achieve these purposes.143 Congress generally requires the Corps to 
“prescribe regulations for the use of storage allocated for flood control or naviga-
tion at all reservoirs constructed wholly or in part with Federal funds provided on 
the basis of such purposes, and the operation of any such project shall be in accord-
ance with such purposes.”144 The Corps thus develops “water control manuals” to 
guide the operation of its projects and “master manuals” for coordinated control of 
multiple projects on a particular river system.145 The Corps produced its first ACF 
manual in 1958, and it would remain in place for decades, in part because years of 
litigation delayed an update of the master manual.146 The Corps finally produced a 
new master manual for its ACF projects in 2017,147 after completing an extensive 
environmental review process.148 
Until recently, the main legal dispute over Corps projects in the ACF has fo-
cused on Lake Lanier, formed by Buford Dam on the Chattahoochee River, north 
of Atlanta. Georgia wanted significantly more of Lake Lanier’s water to serve the 
growing needs of metropolitan Atlanta, but Alabama, Florida, and others interest-
ed in ACF water argued that they would be harmed if the Corps supplied that 
 141. Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104, 111 Stat. 
2219, 2222-23 (1997). 
 142. See Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. at 2509-10. 
 143. See id. at 2529-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 144. 33 U.S.C. § 709 (2012). This language comes from Section 7 of the Flood Control Act of 
1944, 58 Stat. 887, 890. 
 145. See infra Section I.B. 
 146. Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. at 2531 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing history of Corps’ 
ACF manuals and related litigation). 
 147. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, RECORD OF DECISION, APALACHICOLA-
CHATTAHOOCHEE-FLINT MASTER WATER CONTROL MANUAL UPDATE AND WATER SUPPLY 
STORAGE ASSESSMENT 19 (2017) (decision formally adopting the updated master manual) [hereinafter 
ACF MANUAL ROD]. 
 148. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, 
UPDATE OF THE WATER CONTROL MANUAL FOR THE APALACHICOLA-CHATTAHOOCHEE-FLINT 
RIVER BASIN IN ALABAMA, FLORIDA, AND GEORGIA, AND A WATER SUPPLY STORAGE ASSESSMENT 
(2016) [hereinafter ACF MANUAL EIS]. This was a weighty Environmental Impact Statement, with 
Volume 1 alone roughly one thousand pages long, including a 47-page “executive summary.”  
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much water to Atlanta.149 A fundamental legal issue was the extent of the Corps’ 
authority to commit Lake Lanier water for municipal purposes; both the Corps and 
a series of federal cases had found such authority lacking.150 But the 11th Circuit 
Court of Appeals dug into the Corps’ planning reports for Buford Dam and con-
cluded that Atlanta’s water supply was an authorized purpose of the project all 
along,151 therefore giving Georgia access to the water it wanted without the need 
for Congress to approve it.152 Based on that result, when the Corps issued its new 
ACF manual in 2017, it specifically allowed for reallocation of over a quarter mil-
lion acre-feet of Lake Lanier water for use in Georgia.153 Despite losing the battle 
over Lake Lanier, Florida kept up its fight for the waters of the ACF Basin on a 
new front: interstate water litigation in the Supreme Court. 
B.  Florida’s Equitable Apportionment Action 
Florida filed its complaint for equitable apportionment and injunctive relief in 
the Supreme Court in 2013.154 Florida alleged that Georgia’s growing consumption 
of water from the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers for municipal, industrial, and 
agricultural purposes had significantly reduced flows in the Apalachicola. The re-
sult of these reduced flows, Florida contended, was environmental harm in the 
Apalachicola Basin and its enormously productive estuary, including collapse of the 
important oyster fishery in Apalachicola Bay. The complaint alleged that low flows 
in the Apalachicola were causing ecological, economic, and social harm to a part of 
Florida that was highly dependent on natural resources. Florida asked the Court to 
issue an equitable apportionment decree for the waters of the ACF Basin and an 
 149. Se. Fed. Power Customers v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1316, 1318-20 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (examining 
the long history of litigation over distribution of Lake Lanier water); Advocating for the Long-Term 
Health of Two Major River Basins, S. ENVTL. L. CTR, https://www.southernenvironment.org/cases-and-
projects/tri-state-water-wars-al-ga-fl (last visited Nov. 12, 2018) (explaining the increasing water de-
mands of Atlanta as a key driver of the Lake Lanier dispute). 
 150. Se. Fed. Power Customers, 514 F.3d at 1319 (noting Corps’ conclusion in 2002 that it could 
not accommodate Georgia request without further Congressional authorization); id. at 1325 (finding 
that commitment of large volume of Lake Lanier water for municipal use in Georgia would be a major 
operational change requiring Congressional approval). 
 151. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litigation, 644 F.3d 1160, 1186-92 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 152. The Corps had denied Georgia’s request for additional water for Atlanta from Lake Lanier, 
but the 11th Circuit – having held that the Corps did indeed have authority to grant that request – re-
manded the matter to the Corps to reconsider Georgia’s request in light of that holding. Id. at 1192-97. 
 153. ACF MANUAL ROD, supra note 147, at 3. Final reallocation would require an agreement 
whereby Georgia would pay the Corps for the storage space. 
 154. Because the Supreme Court must grant permission to file a case within its original jurisdic-
tion, Florida also filed a Motion for Leave to File a Complaint and a brief in support of that motion. 
The Supreme Court granted that motion in November 2014, allowing Florida’s case to proceed. See 
Report of the Special Master at 14-16, Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502 (2018) (No. 142, Orig.) 
[hereinafter Special Master’s Report].  
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injunction capping Georgia’s depletions.155 Georgia argued that Florida was suffer-
ing no significant harm, and to the extent there was significant harm, it was caused 
by the operations of Corps projects in the ACF Basin, not by Georgia’s water us-
es.156 
By suing Georgia in the Supreme Court, Florida was effectively forced to 
shift its focus from Corps operations to non-federal water allocation, management, 
and use within Georgia. The United States has sovereign immunity in these inter-
state water cases, and some cases have not been allowed to proceed when the feder-
al government refuses to be joined in the litigation.157 In cases (including the Co-
lumbia River salmon litigation158) where the United States is not a party but there 
is an important federal role relating to the merits of the litigation, the plaintiff 
state must establish that it can get effective relief without an order binding the 
federal government.159 For Florida, this means that it must be able to show harm 
caused by Georgia, not the Corps, and also establish that the Court can grant effec-
tive relief without a decree binding the Corps.160 Georgia sought to dismiss the 
case at the outset, arguing that the United States was an indispensable party, but 
the special master161 ruled that effective relief might be possible without federal 
involvement.162 
Unable to attack the Corps’ operations (or its decision to allocate a large 
amount of Lake Lanier storage for municipal and industrial use), Florida focused 
largely on Georgia’s agricultural use. The Flint River supplies much of the irriga-
 155. Id. at 16 (noting Florida’s request to limit Georgia’s depletions from the ACF Basin to 1992 
levels). 
 156. Id. According to the special master, Georgia’s position was “that Florida’s asserted harms are 
imaginary, self-inflicted, or inflicted by the operations of [the Corps] or changes in precipitation pat-
terns (or some combination thereof) but in any event cannot be traced to Georgia’s water use.” Id. at 2. 
 157. See Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 559 (1936) (Lower Colorado River); Texas v. New 
Mexico, 352 U.S. 991 (1957) (Rio Grande). In some cases, the United States has opted to join the litiga-
tion to assert federal interests. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Arizona v. California, 
373 U.S. 546 (1963) (Lower Colorado River). 
 158. See infra Section II.B. 
 159. Idaho I, 444 U.S. 380, 387-92 (1980) (various runs of anadromous fish migrating between 
spawning grounds in Idaho and the Pacific Ocean). As the Court explained: 
Idaho’s narrow complaint is a two-edged sword. It has sidestepped the need to join the 
United States as a party by seeking only a share of the fish now being caught by nontreaty 
fishermen in Oregon and Washington. It now must shoulder the burden of proving that the 
nontreaty fisheries in those two states have adversely and unfairly affected the number of 
fish arriving in Idaho. 
Id. at 392. 
 160. Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2531-32 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 161. The Court in November 2014 appointed Ralph I. Lancaster as special master. See Special 
Master’s Report, supra note 154, at 16-17. Special Master Lancaster is with the Pierce Atwood law firm 
in Portland, Maine. Id. (cover page). 
 162. See id. at 17-20.  
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tion water for farmlands in southern Georgia, and unlike the Chattahoochee, there 
are no Corps dams on the Flint.163 Florida pointed to the enormous growth of ag-
ricultural water use in Georgia, offering evidence that irrigated acreage in that 
state had grown from 75,000 acres in 1970 to over 825,000 acres in 2014.164 The net 
effect of Georgia’s increased consumption, Florida argued, was a substantial reduc-
tion in Apalachicola River flows, especially during the spring and summer of dry 
years.165 
In his report, the special master was critical of Georgia’s approach to the allo-
cation and management of irrigation water, stating that “[e]ven the exceedingly 
modest measures Georgia has taken have proven remarkably ineffective.”166 More 
specifically, he noted that Georgia had largely failed in the severe 2011-2012 
drought to implement a state statute designed to reduce Flint River water use dur-
ing droughts;167 continued approving new irrigation water use permits despite the 
concerns over drought impacts;168 and issued such permits without limiting the 
amount of water to be used in irrigation.169 While he stopped short of finding 
Georgia’s agricultural water use unreasonable, he concluded, “Georgia’s position – 
practically, politically, and legally – can be summarized as follows: Georgia’s agri-
cultural water use should be subject to no limitations, regardless of the long-term 
consequences for the [ACF] Basin.”170 
The special master also had “little question that Florida has suffered harm 
from decreased flows in the River.”171 He noted that the Apalachicola Bay oyster 
fishery had experienced “unprecedent collapse” in the drought year of 2012, when 
 163. Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. at 2508. The Court stated that “there are no dams along the 
Flint River,” but it is more accurate to say that the Flint has no Corps dams; it has at least a couple 
non-federal ones. Special Master’s Report, supra note 154, at app. C. 
 164. Special Master’s Report, supra note 154, at 32-33. “Georgia’s own estimates show a dramatic 
growth in consumptive water use for agricultural purposes.” Id. at 33. 
 165. Id. at 15. This reduction was allegedly caused by all of Georgia’s water development and use 
in the ACF Basin, not just by irrigation. 
 166. Id. at 33. 
 167. Id. 
For instance, although Georgia adopted the Flint River Drought Protection Act . . . in or-
der to permit the State temporarily to ‘buy back’ agricultural irrigation rights at auction and 
thereby reduce water use during droughts, Georgia failed to implement the FRDPA’s auc-
tion in 2011 and 2012 during one of the worst droughts on record. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 168. Id. at 34 (noting that Georgia had continued to approve backlogged permit applications, 
imposing only a temporary moratorium on new applications). 
 169. Id. at 33. 
 170. Id. at 34. By contrast, he noted that Georgia appeared to have taken significant steps to have 
conserved water for municipal and industrial purposes in the Atlanta area, “though only after having 
been spurred to take such steps by adverse litigation results.” Id. at 34 n.28. 
 171. Id. at 31.  
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“oyster mortality reached devastating levels” that virtually wiped out oysters in 
many areas that had been productive.172 The special master was apparently con-
vinced that the mortality was caused by low flows in the river, resulting in higher 
salinity levels in the bay.173 The collapse of the fishery caused economic as well as 
ecological damage, leaving the future of Apalachicola Bay oyster harvesters in 
doubt.174 He did not discuss whether Florida had shown environmental harm in 
any other way, though his report noted that the Apalachicola River supports “a 
unique ecosystem” that supports a remarkably diverse array of species.175 
While the special master was seemingly convinced of Florida’s harm and 
Georgia’s “likely misuse of resources,”176 he did not make specific factual findings 
on these points. Even assuming that unreasonable water use in Georgia was caus-
ing serious harm to Florida, the special master doubted that the Court could effec-
tively remedy that harm without being able to bind the Corps.177 He then devoted 
about 35 pages – half the entire report, and nearly all of its analysis178 – to an ex-
amination of whether increased flows in the Flint River (due to limiting Georgia 
irrigation) would reliably translate to increased flows in the Apalachicola below the 
Jim Woodruff Dam. Despite the absence of Corps dams on the Flint, the special 
master concluded that improved flows on that river might not benefit the Apala-
chicola during dry seasons, based on the Corps’ ability to withhold more water 
from its dams on the Chattahoochee and the operating protocols provided in the 
Corps’ existing water control manual for its projects in the ACF Basin.179 He 
found that the Corps: 
 172. Id. 
 173. He noted that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration had reached this con-
clusion when it declared a fishery disaster for Apalachicola Bay in 2013. He noted that Georgia argued 
that the collapse was due to Florida’s failure to manage the fishery appropriately but concluded that 
“the evidence presented tends to show that increased salinity rather than harvesting pressure led to the 
collapse.” Id. at 31-32 (citations omitted). 
 174. Id. at 32. 
 175. Id. at 8 (identifying endangered or threatened species of freshwater mussels that live in the 
Apalachicola River, along with the threatened Gulf sturgeon). 
 176. “As the evidentiary hearing made clear, Florida points to real harm and, at the very least, 
likely misuse of resources by Georgia.” Id. at 31. 
 177. In a key paragraph of his report, the special master wrote: 
Much more could be said and would need to be said about these issues (as well as other is-
sues, such as causation) were Florida and Georgia the only parties whose activities were im-
plicated in this action. However, they are not. As already described, the Corps also conducts 
significant operations in the Basin. Regardless of the harm suffered by Florida and the un-
reasonableness of Georgia’s agricultural water use, it is necessary to determine whether the 
activities of the Corps render uncertain any relief to Florida stemming from a Court decree 
capping Georgia’s consumptive water use. 
Id. at 34. 
 178. Id. at 35-69. The “Analysis” section began on page 30, and the report ended on page 70. 
 179. Id. at 46-62.  
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[C]an likely offset increased streamflow in the Flint River by storing ad-
ditional water in its reservoirs along the Chattahoochee River during dry 
periods. The evidence also shows that the Corps retains extensive discre-
tion in the operation of those federal reservoirs. As a result, the Corps 
can release (or not release) water largely as it sees fit . . . .180 
Having concluded that Florida had failed to show by clear and convincing evidence 
that the Court could order an effective remedy in the Corps absence, he recom-
mended that the Court deny Florida’s request for relief.181 
C.  The Court’s 2018 Decision 
Florida’s case survived, albeit barely, as a 5-4 majority held that the special 
master “applied too strict a standard when he determined that the Court would not 
be able to fashion an appropriate equitable decree.”182 The Court ruled that the 
special master erred in requiring Florida to show by clear and convincing evidence 
that the remedy would be effective without Corps action. That level of proof on 
the remedy should not be required “unless and until the Special Master makes the 
findings of fact necessary to determine the nature and scope of likely harm caused 
by the absence of water and the amount of additional water necessary to ameliorate 
that harm significantly . . . .”183 Until that point the complaining state need only 
establish, under principles of “flexibility and “approximation,” that it is likely the 
Court could fashion a workable decree.184 Applying that standard, the Court ruled 
that Florida had done enough at this stage, and remanded the case to the special 
master for further proceedings.185 
The Court made clear that environmental harm is relevant in determining 
whether a state is receiving its equitable share of the waters of an interstate river. 
The majority emphasized that all factors are relevant in an equitable apportion-
ment determination,186 and stated that a key question on remand was whether a cap 
on Georgia’s water consumption might increase flows in the Apalachicola enough 
to “significantly redress the economic and ecological harm that Florida has suf-
 180. Id. at 69. 
 181. Id. at 70: 
Florida has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that any additional streamflow in 
the Flint River resulting from a decree imposing a consumptive cap on Georgia’s water use 
would be released from Jim Woodruff Dam into the River at a time that would provide a 
material benefit to Florida. 
 182. Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2516 (2018). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 2516, 2517. 
 185. Id. at 2526-27. 
 186. Id. at 2515 (quoting from earlier equitable apportionment cases and adding emphasis to the 
word “all”).  
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fered[.]”187 The Court noted the special master’s statements on the collapse of the 
oyster fishery and its impacts in Florida, involving both economic and ecological 
harm. And in the Court’s clearest-ever statement regarding damage to the natural 
world under equitable apportionment, it observed: 
The harms of reduced streamflow may extend to other species in the 
Apalachicola region, including in the river and its floodplain, which, as 
the Master noted, “is home to the highest species density of amphibians 
and reptiles in all of North America, and supports hundreds of endan-
gered or threatened animal and plant species,” including three “endan-
gered” or “threatened” mussel species, the “threatened Gulf sturgeon,” 
and the largest stand of Tupelo trees – of Tupelo Honey fame – in the 
world.188 
Thus, the Court indicated that harm to plant and animal species – endangered or 
not – is a relevant factor and did not suggest that a species must have some com-
mercial use or value to be considered.189 
The key issue for all nine justices, as it was for the special master, was the po-
tential impact of Corps dams and their operations on flows in the Apalachicola 
River. The majority devoted about a third of its opinion to this issue, focusing 
heavily on the Corps’ operating protocols for both drought and non-drought opera-
tions under the current Master Manual for its projects in the ACF Basin.190 The 
majority deduced that, “even when the Corps conducts its operations in accordance 
with the Master Manual, Florida’s proposed consumption cap would likely mean 
more water in the Apalachicola . . . .”191 In the end, the Court believed that a 
workable decree would be possible despite the Corps’ “inherent discretion” in op-
erating its projects.192 
 187. The Court actually broke this into two questions: to what extent would a cap on Georgia’s 
consumption likely increase flows in the Apalachicola – a question that implicates Corps dams and their 
operations – and to what extent would those increased flows address Florida’s harm. Id. at 2518. 
 188. Id. at 2519 (alterations omitted). The mention of “Tupelo Honey fame” refers to Van Mor-
rison’s soulful love song on the album of the same title. VAN MORRISON, TUPELO HONEY (Warner 
Bros. 1971). 
 189. This latter point presumably applies to most of the reptile and amphibian species found in 
the ACF Basin, which unlike oysters are not commercially harvested. 
 190. See Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. at 2519-26. The majority opinion runs from pp. 2508 to 
2527. 
 191. The Court continued that existing operations should mean that the Apalachicola would re-
ceive “as much as 2,000 cfs [cubic feet per second] more water when the Corps is conducting normal or 
‘non-drought operations,’ and which could take place in dry periods, . . . and 500 cfs more on days 
when the Corps is conducting ‘drought operations.’” Id. at 2523. 
 192. Id. at 2526 (quoting the Special Master’s Report at 56, n.38) (alterations omitted).  
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The dissent, authored by Justice Thomas,193 seemingly took no issue with the 
majority on the relevance of environmental factors,194 but otherwise saw the case 
very differently. The dissent agreed with the special master on the legal standard 
he applied to Florida’s request for relief.195 The dissent further contended that 
even if the standard were incorrect, “his findings are plainly correct and establish 
that Georgia should prevail under the balance-of-harms test.”196 Finally, the dis-
sent devoted roughly a quarter of its opinion197 to examining the effect of the 
Corps’ operations. It took a very different view of the Master Manual’s impact 
during drought periods, believing that they would effectively prevent increased 
flows in the Apalachicola even if more water came down the Flint.198 For the dis-
sent, then, “the Special Master was correct to find that the Corps would not 
change its operations during droughts if this Court capped Georgia’s water use and 
thus Florida would not benefit from a cap during droughts.”199 
Both the majority and the dissent found support for their positions in the 
United States’ amicus brief explaining the Corps’ ACF operations,200 which care-
fully straddled the fence between the Florida and Georgia positions. On one hand, 
the United States explained that a cap on Georgia’s consumption would mean 
higher flows in the Flint, resulting in more water reaching Florida under current 
Corps operating protocols.201 On the other hand, the brief stated that during 
drought operations in the ACF system, higher flows in the Flint would not likely 
result in higher flows in the Apalachicola because the Corps would likely release no 
more than 5,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) from the Jim Woodruff Dam and store 
 193. With Justice Thomas on the dissent were Justices Alito, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Id. at 2528 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 194. See id. at 2547 (discussing potential harm to species beyond oysters but noting that the spe-
cial master had found only harm to oysters resulting from low flows in the Apalachicola). The dissent 
insisted, however, that the balance of harms would always favor Georgia because of Florida’s small eco-
nomic losses compared to the potential economic harm to Georgia of restricting agricultural uses. Id. at 
2547-48. The dissent also emphasized that Georgia’s portion of the ACF Basin – which, of course, in-
cludes the Atlanta metropolitan area – has a population of 5 million compared to 100,000 for the Florida 
portion of the Basin, and that the gross regional product is $283 billion compared to $2 billion. Id. at 
2529. 
 195. Id. at 2536-37 (concluding that, contrary to the majority’s view, the special master had ap-
propriately “applied the ordinary balance-of-harms test dictated by this Court’s precedents”). 
 196. Id. at 2536, 2540-41. 
 197. See id. at 2541-46. The dissent runs from pp. 2528 to 2548. 
 198. See id. at 2542-45. 
 199. Id. at 2540. The dissent also insisted that Florida’s only showing of harm was during 
drought periods. Id. at 2546-47. 
 200. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502 (2018) 
(No. 142, Orig.) (Aug. 2017) [hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief]. 
 201. Id. at 16-17 (noting that higher flows in the Apalachicola were “more a question of timing 
than whether the flows would reach Florida at all”).  
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the rest in upstream reservoirs.202 Thus, during drought operations, “Apalachicola 
River flows would be very similar with or without a consumption cap” on Geor-
gia.203 But while higher flows in the Flint might not change the Corps’ releases 
during drought operations, they could still benefit Florida by providing “an addi-
tional ‘cushion,’ delaying the onset of or hastening the recovery from drought op-
erations,”204 and thus allowing for fewer days where the release would not exceed 
5,000 cfs.205 As for whether the Corps might change its operations to effect a Su-
preme Court decree, the United States reiterated the Corps’ commitment to “take 
[that] into account and adjust its operations accordingly, including new or revised 
[Master Manuals] . . . .”206 But the brief seemed to walk back that statement,207 
refusing to commit the Corps to making any operational changes based on a Su-
preme Court decree apportioning the waters of the ACF Basin.208 
These somewhat contradictory statements allowed the majority and the dis-
sent to take strikingly different views of whether the Corps’ operating decisions 
would likely render ineffective any decree the Court might issue. The dissent flatly 
stated that “the Corps will not change its existing practices,” regardless of what the 
Court might order.209 Except as provided in the existing Master Manual, the 
 202. Id. at 28. The brief noted that the 5,000 cfs minimum release during drought operations 
“was determined in consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service to protect the threatened Gulf stur-
geon” and the mussel species protected by the Endangered Species Act. Id. at 9. 
 203. Id. at 28. The dissent emphasized this point in concluding that Florida had not shown that 
capping Georgia’s consumption would benefit the Apalachicola during drought periods, when it was 
clearly harmed by low flows. Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. at 2545 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 204. U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 200, at 18. 
 205. Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. at 2522. The majority emphasized this point in concluding 
that Florida would obtain a measure of drought relief from a consumption cap on Georgia, even under 
the Corps’ current operating protocols. 
 206. U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 200, at 30 (quoting from the Corps’ ACF MANUAL ROD, 
supra note 147, at 18). 
 207. The brief stated that the Corps “stood by that statement” from its Record of Decision, but 
then said that the Corps “would have to consider” whether it could provide higher releases for Florida 
“under its existing authorities . . . .” Id. at 30. 
 208. The brief suggested the Corps would “consider” a Supreme Court decree in making ACF 
operating decisions: 
Of course, a decision by the Court apportioning the waters of the ACF Basin, whether in 
the form of a consumption cap or something else, would necessarily form part of the con-
stellation of laws to be considered by the Corps when deciding how best to operate the fed-
eral projects in the ACF Basin for their congressionally authorized purposes. But unlike a 
compact among the States that is approved by Congress or legislation altering the purposes 
of the ACF system, an apportionment by this Court in the form of a consumption cap 
would not formally bind the Corps to take any particular action because the United States is 
not a party to this suit, which has proceeded on the understanding that any relief must be 
shaped without mandating a change in the Corps’ operations. 
Id. at 32. 
 209. Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. at 2541 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
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Corps would be unlikely to increase releases into the Apalachicola.210 As for 
whether the Corps might change the Master Manual, “there are a host of reasons 
to doubt the Corps would voluntarily change its procedures just because this Court 
capped Georgia’s use.”211 In short, the dissent believed the Corps would simply 
ignore the Court. 
The majority, by contrast, found reason to believe that the Corps would take 
steps to effectuate any decree the Court might issue. For one thing, the majority 
found it likely that increased flows in the Flint would pass through to Florida’s 
benefit, even under the Corps’ existing protocols.212 It also gave credence to federal 
statements that the Corps would “work to accommodate any determinations or ob-
ligations” set forth by the Court in an ACF Basin decree.213 Thus, while the major-
ity recognized the “variety of circumstances and statutory obligations”214 that drive 
the Corps’ operating decisions, it believed that the Court could find a way to craft 
an effective decree – and that the Corps would help it do so.215 
Though it allowed the case to proceed, the Court ended with a cautionary 
note, emphasizing that Florida would be entitled to relief only if it could show that 
the benefits of a decree would substantially outweigh the harm.216 That could 
prove exceedingly difficult, especially since all four dissenters believe that the bal-
ance of harms clearly tips in Georgia’s favor,217 and since one member of the ma-
jority – Justice Kennedy – has retired. If and when the case returns to the Court, 
the Corps’ operating protocols and practices could again become a crucial issue. In 
considering the role of federal dams in the ACF Basin, the Court must take a 
broader view of the legal and policy context in which the Corps makes operating 
decisions. 
 210. Id. at 2542 (“All available evidence suggests that the Corps would not exercise its discretion 
to release more water into the Apalachicola River during droughts.”). 
 211. Id. For the dissent, these reasons include the Corps’ operating history in the ACF Basin, the 
years of litigation over the prior manual revision, and the heavy procedural requirements associated 
with a new revision. Id. at 2544. 
 212. Id. at 2520-21 (record shows it is “highly unlikely that the Corps will always reduce the 
flow” in the Apalachicola by storing all available water in excess of the 5,000 cfs minimum release dur-
ing drought operations); id. at 2523 (projecting higher flows in drought and non-drought periods result-
ing from capping Georgia’s consumption). 
 213. Id. at 2526. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Although the special master believed that the Corps’ inherent discretion in operating the 
ACF projects made effective relief highly uncertain, the majority determined that it could still produce 
a workable decree. “[T]he record leads us to believe that, if necessary and with the help of the United 
States, the Special Master, and the parties, we should be able to fashion one.” Id. 
 216. Id. at 2528 (quoting from Colorado v. New Mexico I, 459 U.S. 176, 187 (1982)). 
 217. Id. at 2547 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (declaring that “it is clear who should prevail in this 
case”).  
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IV.  CAN FEDERAL DAMS BLOCK EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT? 
In its 2018 Florida v. Georgia decision, the Court had to decide whether Corps 
project operations would preclude effective relief of Florida’s economic and envi-
ronmental harm. In his report, the special master looked closely at the Corps’ ACF 
operating regime and its potential effect on Apalachicola River flows.218 The 
Court’s majority and dissenting opinions both did the same,219 even though they 
disagreed sharply on whether the regime could provide for a workable decree. The 
problem with both opinions, however, is that they focused too narrowly on the 
Corps’ existing Master Manual for the ACF Basin, overlooking some important 
laws, policies, and principles regarding Corps operating decisions. 
First, according to the Corps’ own Water Control Management rules,220 water 
control plans221 are supposed to be reviewed at least every ten years222 and “revised 
as necessary to conform with changing requirements resulting from developments 
in the project area and downstream, improvements in technology, improved under-
standing of ecological response and sustainability, new legislation and other rele-
vant factors, provided such revisions comply with existing federal regulations and 
established Corps policy.”223 In fact, in issuing its Biological Opinion under the 
ESA224 regarding the new ACF Master Manual, the Fish and Wildlife Service 
noted that the Master Manual was to be “reviewed every 5 years pursuant to [the 
Corps’] South Atlantic Division Policy,” and therefore the Service issued its Bio-
logical Opinion “with the understanding that the [Manual] may be revised or up-
 218. Special Master’s Report, supra note 154, at 35-69. 
 219. Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. at 2520-25; id. at 2541-46 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 220. Water Control Management Rule, supra note 39. 
 221. Water control plans are to “include coordinated regulation schedules for project/system reg-
ulation and any additional provisions required to collect, analyze and disseminate data; prepare detailed 
operating instructions;” and operate projects safely and appropriately. Id., para. 3-2(b). Water control 
plans are then incorporated into water control manuals. Id. 
 222. Id., para. 3-2(j). 
 223. Id., para. 3-2(j)(1). This paragraph concludes, “[a]t any time during project implementation, 
it may be appropriate to revise the water control plan.” 
 224. Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act prohibits any federal agency from taking an action 
that would jeopardize the continued existence of a threatened or endangered species. 16 U.S.C. § 
1536(a)(2) (2012). To ensure that it meets this requirement, the agency before taking action must con-
sult with the Fish & Wildlife Service (or, for oceangoing species, the National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice) on the effects of the proposed action on listed species and their habitat. Id. The Service’s Biologi-
cal Opinion is its determination of the likely effects of the agency’s action on those species. Id. § 
1536(b). If an agency fails to consult on its proposed action – even an ongoing action, such as operation 
of a federal water project – it violates the Endangered Species Act. See, e.g., Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fish-
ermen’s Ass’ns v. Bureau of Reclamation, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1246-50 (2001) (finding violation by 
Bureau of Reclamation for failure to consult on its Klamath Project operations for 2000, and issuing 
injunction pending completion of consultation for 2001 operations, even though Bureau had completed 
consultation for years before 2000).  
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dated within 5 years (i.e., in 2021) . . . .”225 Thus, the 2017 ACF Master Manual is 
not a long-term fixture in determining flows in the Apalachicola River. To the con-
trary, per the Corps’ own policies and rules the Master Manual should be reviewed 
no later than 2021,226 or at the latest 2027, and revised as needed to address factors 
far less weighty than a Supreme Court decree apportioning an interstate river.227 
Second, while the Court recognized that the Corps must operate its projects in 
accordance with their congressionally authorized purposes,228 it may not have fully 
understood that the Corps retains much discretion in choosing how best to balance 
and serve those general purposes. In its amicus brief, the United States noted that 
Congress authorized the Corps’ ACF Basin projects for multiples purposes, “in-
cluding navigation, hydroelectric power, national defense, commercial value of ri-
parian lands, recreation, and industrial and municipal water supply.”229 The United 
States did not suggest, however, that these authorized purposes could only be 
served by operating the projects in accordance with the 2017 Master Manual. In 
fact, in its Environmental Impact Statement for the ACF Master Manual revision, 
the Corps considered seven alternative operating regimes, each of which favored 
some purposes over others.230 Any of these alternatives seemingly would have 
served project purposes, as proposals that would have conflicted with them were 
not considered.231 Thus, while project purposes are set in statute, they leave the 
Corps a considerable range of options for meeting them – and while some options 
may appear better than others, those judgment calls are made by the Corps, not 
Congress.232 
 225. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR ACF WATER CONTROL 
MANUAL, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2016) (noting that the Biological Opinion “will be reviewed, or 
consultation will be reinitiated at that time” when the Manual is reviewed). 
 226. This is doubly important because review of the Manual, whenever it happens, will involve a 
reinitiation of Endangered Species Act consultation. Id. A new Biological Opinion could make a mean-
ingful difference for Apalachicola River flow levels during droughts, as the current 5,000 cfs minimum 
release from Jim Woodruff Dam was established largely to protect ESA-listed species. Special Master’s 
Report, supra note 154, at 34; see also supra note 177. Thus, a new ESA consultation could result in a 
minimum flow level higher or lower than the established 5,000 cfs. 
 227. The GAO in 2015 found that the Corps does not actually update its water control plans 
regularly, despite the official policy, with funding constraints a primary reason for the delays. U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-660, ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS: EFFORTS TO ASSESS 
THE IMPACT OF EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS 19 (2015). The report noted that some Corps officials 
had requested funding to update the plans, but the funding was not approved. 
 228. Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2526 (2018); see also id. at 2530 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). 
 229. U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 200, at 4 (citing various Corps project planning reports and 
statutes approving them). 
 230. ACF MANUAL EIS, supra note 148, at ES-18. The final EIS analyzed ten alternatives in 
detail, most of which were variations on the favored Alternative 7. Id. at ES-18 to ES-36. 
 231. Id. at ES-13. 
 232. ACF MANUAL ROD, supra note 147, at 1-10 (explaining alternatives studied, factors consid-
ered, and reasons for choosing the preferred alternative).  
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Third, the Court should consider the incentives that would arise from allow-
ing the Corps to effectively block equitable apportionment in the ACF Basin. In 
this case, the Corps’ operating decisions may be found to preclude a workable de-
cree; not because of any clear conflict with project purposes,233 but simply because 
the Corps will not be bound and will choose not to change its practices. If that 
happens, Georgia will have been allowed to exceed its fair share of the waters of an 
interstate river system234 due to the presence of federal dams in the basin. Given 
that there are well over a thousand federal dams on rivers across the nation,235 this 
could mean that equitable apportionment is practically unavailable on many inter-
state river systems. Of course, the Court continues to encourage states (and has 
encouraged the ACF Basin states) to resolve their water disputes by compact.236 
But if an upstream state can defeat equitable apportionment simply by the pres-
ence of a federal dam, why would it choose to negotiate?237 
This problem is presented not because the Corps is unable to join the case, but 
because it has chosen not to. Ironically, if this litigation were a general water rights 
adjudication in state court, the United States could be required to join the proceed-
ing under the terms of a statute known as the McCarran Amendment.238 As inter-
preted by the Court, the McCarran Amendment has meant that even reserved 
right claims for federal and tribal lands under the Winters doctrine have been liti-
gated in state courts, which puts those important federal interests in a forum gen-
erally seen as adverse or even hostile to them.239 Subjecting such federal and tribal 
 233. The dissent noted the tension between preserving project storage and increasing releases to 
the Apalachicola during drought periods. Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. at 2543 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). But this kind of tension is inherent in the operation of projects with multiple purposes, especially 
when upstream and downstream states are involved, as illustrated by the multi-state litigation over the 
Corps’ operation of its projects on the Missouri River. See In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 
421 F.3d 618, 624-28 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 234. Neither the special master nor the Court has yet determined that Georgia is exceeding its 
fair share of ACF waters, although the special master did suggest that there has been, “at the very least, 
likely misuse of resources by Georgia.” Special Master’s Report, supra note 154, at 31. 
 235. The Bureau of Reclamation built more than 600 dams, while the Corps claims nearly 700. 
About Us, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/main/about (last visited June 20, 
2015); Dam Safety Program, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, http://www.usace.army.mil/
Missions/CivilWorks/DamSafetyProgram.aspx (last visited Aug. 7, 2014). 
 236. Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. at 2509 (citing several interstate water cases). 
 237. In years past, the prospect of federal money for new water projects gave states an incentive 
to enter into compacts. See DOUGLAS L. GRANT & GREGORY S. WEBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
WATER LAW 495 (8th ed. 2010) (quoting Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 48 
(1966)). Now that the federal government is not building many new big projects, however, the states no 
longer have that source of motivation to resolve their water disagreements through negotiation. 
 238. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994) (giving consent to join the United States as a defendant in any “ad-
judication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source,” or for the administration of 
such rights, when the United States is the owner of water rights or in the process of acquiring them). 
 239. See Michael C. Blumm et al., The Mirage of Indian Water Rights and Western Streamflow Resto-
ration in the McCarran Amendment Era: A Promise Unfulfilled, 36 ENVTL. L. 1157 (2006) (summarizing  
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claims to state court jurisdiction was not specifically required by the statute but 
was necessary, said the Court, to effectuate its purpose of allowing all water right 
claims to be litigated in a single proceeding.240 This policy argument would seem 
far stronger in the case of interstate water litigation where the Court is the only 
available forum to settle these major disputes between sovereigns.241 But since 
there is nothing like the McCarran Amendment for Supreme Court cases,242 there 
is no way to force the United States to join the ACF litigation, even though the 
federal government no longer seems to have a compelling reason to stay out.243 
Whatever else might be said about American water federalism, most observers 
would likely agree that the federal government should normally support a state’s 
water management priorities. And if a federal agency is going to frustrate a key 
state goal, it should be necessary to serve an important national interest. Congress 
has repeatedly stated its respect for state primacy in water allocation and manage-
ment,244 and importantly for the ACF Basin, did so in the 1944 Flood Control 
Act245 – a key source of authority for Corps projects nationally.246 In Section 1 of 
Supreme Court’s application of McCarran Amendment, subjecting tribal claims to state court jurisdic-
tion and criticizing state courts’ handling of tribal reserved right claims in a series of cases). 
 240. Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority Under Fed-
eral Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 268-69 (2006) (explaining series of Supreme 
Court cases interpreting the McCarran Amendment). 
 241. See Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. at 2512-16 (explaining basic principles of these interstate 
cases). 
 242. Congress may want to consider waiving federal sovereign immunity for interstate litigation 
in the Supreme Court, at least on a case-by-case basis. In the case of Florida v. Georgia, allowing joinder 
of the United States would provide a judicial forum that includes all the key sovereigns in the ACF 
Basin. Without such a forum it seems much less likely that the ACF Basin states could agree on a water 
allocation compact. See id. at 2511. Congress in 2014 specifically urged the ACF states to develop a 
compact, Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-121, § 1051, 128 Stat. 
1193, 1259, though it repealed that language two years later. Water Infrastructure Improvements for the 
Nation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-322, § 1187, 130 Stat. 1628, 1681 (2016). 
 243. The federal government’s amicus brief states that: 
the United States did not intervene in this action in large part to avoid being bound by a 
decree that could directly affect Corps operations before the Corps had a chance to finally 
complete its process of updating the Master Manual and individual reservoir regulation 
manuals for the ACF Basin . . . . 
U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 200, at 32. The brief did not explain why, since the Corps adopted its 
new Master Manual in March 2017, the Corps still believes that it should not join the litigation. 
 244. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 n.5 (1978) (referring to a list of 
“37 statutes in which Congress has expressly recognized the importance of deferring to state water 
law”). 
 245. Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887 (codified in scattered sections of multiple 
titles of the U.S. Code). 
 246. For example, Section 7 of the 1944 Act required the Secretary of War “to prescribe regula-
tions for the use of storage allocated for flood control or navigation at all reservoirs constructed wholly 
or in part with Federal funds provided on the basis of such purposes, and the operation of any such pro-
jects shall be in accordance with such regulations . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 709 (2012). Recreational use of  
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the 1944 Act, Congress declared a policy “to recognize the interests and rights of 
the States in determining the development of the watersheds within their borders 
and likewise their interests and rights in water utilization and control . . . .”247 
Congress specifically directed the Corps to consult with affected states in the 
course of investigating potential projects, to send its reports on recommended pro-
jects to the affected states for review and comment, and to provide any state com-
ments to Congress along with the underlying Corps reports.248 
Congress thus ensured that affected States, consistent with their “interests and 
rights” in water management, have a voice in the investigation, planning, and au-
thorization of Corps projects.249 Given this framework of cooperative federal-
ism,250 it is remarkable that the Corps, simply to protect its operating plan, might 
ultimately prevent Florida from vindicating its equitable right to the waters of the 
ACF Basin.251 It is also remarkable that the Corps could take that position, effec-
tively putting Florida’s rights in great peril, yet receive no criticism from Supreme 
Court justices who often question the exercise of agency discretion.252 
It remains true, of course, that without a waiver of the United States’ sover-
eign immunity, the Court cannot issue a decree that will officially bind the Corps. 
But if Florida makes its case for relief, the Court must not deny a remedy simply 
because it cannot force the Corps to make any changes in its operations. That re-
sult would practically elevate an agency’s project operating plan over a state’s right 
to equitable apportionment, ignoring the true status of that operating plan and 
turning basic notions of American water law upside down. 
Corps projects was addressed in Section 4, 16 U.S.C. § 460d, marketing of hydropower generated at 
Corps dams was authorized in Section 5, 16 U.S.C. § 825s, and so on. 
 247. 33 U.S.C. § 701-1 (2012) (codifying Section 1 of the Flood Control Act of 1944). 
 248. See id. § 701-1(a). 
 249. See id. The Corps’ investigations of potential projects: 
shall be conducted in such a manner as to give to the affected State or States, during the 
course of the investigations, information developed by the investigations and also oppor-
tunity for consultation regarding plans and proposals, and to the extent deemed practicable 
by the Chief of Engineers, opportunity to cooperate in the investigations. 
Id. 
 250. The Court emphasized cooperative federalism in the context of Bureau of Reclamation pro-
jects, holding that federal law requires the Bureau to comply with requirements of state water law so 
long as they are “not inconsistent” with Congressional directives. See e.g., California v. United States, 
438 U.S. 645, 674 (1978). The Court stressed “cooperative federalism,”, and in emphasizing Congres-
sional deference to state water law, it quoted Section 1 of the Flood Control Act. Id. at 650-51, 678. 
 251. Apalachicola River flows have been protected under state law since 2006, when the North-
west Florida Water Management District acted to reserve the “magnitude, duration and frequency of 
observed flows . . . for the protection of fish and wildlife of the river, floodplain and Apalachicola Bay.” 
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40A-2.223 (2014). 
 252. I refer here to the staunchly conservative dissenters in Florida v. Georgia, Justices Alito, 
Gorsuch, and Thomas. See generally Florida v. Georgia 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2528-48 (2018) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (dissenters broadly approving of the Corps’ position in the case).  
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CONCLUSION 
Florida v. Georgia lives on, as the Supreme Court narrowly rejected the special 
master’s recommendation to deny relief. But Florida still has a high hill to climb 
before it earns an equitable apportionment decree. Although it has already shown 
that low flows have caused “real harm” in the collapse of the Apalachicola Bay oys-
ter fishery, it must further establish that a decree would bring benefits to Florida 
that would “substantially outweigh the harm” to Georgia,253 which has always been 
a difficult burden for the complaining state in these cases.254 The Court has sug-
gested that the special master may need to make more detailed findings on a range 
of factual issues regarding Florida’s harm, Georgia’s use, and the Corps’ influ-
ence.255 
The United States remains a non-party, which nearly ended the case when the 
special master concluded that effective relief could not be assured without the 
Corps. The Court narrowly disagreed, but the role of the Corps and its projects 
still looms large in the dispute.256 To the extent that Florida can show that it has 
been harmed by the flow regime on the Apalachicola, Georgia is sure to argue that 
the harm was caused by the existence and operations of the Corps’ string of dams 
in ACF Basin, which Florida cannot contest in this proceeding. Assuming that 
Florida can show it is entitled to relief, the Court will have to determine finally 
whether it can order an effective remedy without being able to bind the Corps. In 
considering the effects of the Corps’ project operations, whether in determining 
causation or deciding on a remedy, the Court must see the 2017 Master Manual for 
what it is: an agency operating plan that may bind the Corps,257 but is not a per-
manent and immutable part of the law of the ACF Basin. 
The case may well turn on whether Florida can establish that low flows in the 
river are causing significant environmental harm, and whether the Court sees that 
kind of harm as important enough to warrant restrictions on Georgia’s consump-
tive uses. It seems likely that Florida must prove harm that goes beyond oysters, 
valuable as they are, because four members of the Court have already declared that 
the losses of the oyster fishery can never outweigh the harm to Georgia’s agricul-
tural users. If the value of a river is nothing more than economic, the Court will 
likely deny relief.258 But the Court has already noted that the ACF Basin supports 
a rich and unique ecosystem that is home to a diverse array of species, all relying to 
 253. Id. at 2527. 
 254. See infra Section I.A. 
 255. Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. at 2527 (laying out questions to be addressed, which are es-
sentially the same ones identified and examined in Part IV of the majority opinion, id. at 2517-26). 
 256. See infra Section III.C. 
 257. See South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1027-30 (8th Cir. 2003) (ruling that the 
Corps’ Master Manual for operating its Missouri River Basin projects was binding on the Corps). 
 258. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.  
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some degree upon adequate flows.259 And if, as Justice Holmes wrote, a river is a 
treasure – whose value is not just in the dollars it generates but also the life it sus-
tains – then environmental flows will carry real weight in equitable apportionment.  
The future of the Apalachicola may turn on the Court’s view of the true worth of a 
river. 
 
 259. See supra notes 190-99 and accompanying text.  
 
